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Abstract 
It is known from Grout (1984) that if the investment decision by the firm precedes the wage 
bargain, it will be unable implicitly to share the cost of capital with its workforce through 
negotiating a lower wage, and that this leads to under-investment.  However, in a model, 
where there is asymmetric information of firms’ differing levels of productivity and where 
workers are mobile between firms before but not after the wage bargain, firms may invest 
also to signal their relative productivities in order to attract workers.  Thus, asymmetric 
information leads to an additional over-investment effect that may outweigh the under-
investment effect of the hold-up, so that the capital stock may be higher if investment 
precedes the wage bargain.   
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1.  Introduction 
A well established result from Grout (1984) is that firms will under-invest if their investment 
decisions precede the wage bargain. The rationale is that by that time the cost of capital will 
already have been incurred, so that the workforce will be absolved of sharing in any of its 
cost implicitly through accepting a lower wage.   Even if the wage bargain and the investment 
decision are simultaneous, so that there is the potential for the both parties to share the cost of 
investment, the workforce may still be able to avoid sharing in the cost by renegotiating the 
wage where contracts are non-binding.  A statutory requirement that wage contracts are 
binding will have a limited application, if the life of the capital stock acquired through the 
investment exceeds the length of the wage contract.
 3 
 
These basic insights are maintained in the following analysis but with extension to a market 
model where firms vary in productivity and where workers are mobile between firms before 
but not after the wage bargain.   As, at the start, there is asymmetric information, because 
firms know their own productivities but, initially, workers do not, firms have an incentive to 
signal their productivities to workers through their investment decisions.  This rests on the 
full employment result that profits are increasing in workforce size and the assumption that 
once allocated workers will subsequently become immobile.  This gives rise to two positive 
effects on investment alongside the negative one of the hold-up.   One is an over-investment 
effect, since capital is employed  not only as a factor input in its own right but also as a signal 
in order to attract the other initially mobile factor of labour.  The second is an allocative 
efficiency effect, since investment signalling ensures that the more productive firms attract 
proportionally more workers, causing an overall increase in productivity as an average across 
firms.  These two positive effects will dominate the negative one, if workers’ relative 
bargaining power is not too high, which would cause the hold-up effect to be the dominating 
factor.  A subsidiary result is that workers will prefer investment to come first for a broader 
                                          
3 The analysis throughout is concerned with the demand for investment.  Alternatively, Devereux and Lockwood 
(1991) considered the supply of investment in a two-period overlapping generations model where workers are 
the only households that save, so that non-binding contracts may increase the rate of endogenous economic 
growth through raising wages.  3 
 
range of parameter values and that firms in general will be even more adverse to this 
possibility. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next one contains the main analysis by looking at 
three cases of where the investment decision lies in the overall sequence of events.  The first 
case is where the investment and the wage bargain are simultaneous, the standard binding 
contracts case.  The second is where investment precedes the wage bargain, so the classic 
problem of the hold-up arises, but it also follows the allocation of workers to firms, 
precluding a role for signalling.  The third and final case is where investment precedes both 
the wage bargain and the allocation of workers to firms, so that there is both a hold-up effect 
and a signalling effect.  The main proposition of the paper is that investment may be highest 
in this third case where it comes sufficiently far in advance.   Section 3 extends the discussion 
a little and Section 4 draws the analysis to an end.  
 
2.  Analysis 
2.1     Where the wage bargain and investment are simultaneous 
There is a unit measure of firms, indexed i , each with the profit function, 
i i i i i i i w m Rk m k A − − =
β α π ,      1 0 < + < β α                        (1) 
where  i A  is total factor productivity that varies across firms and may thus be a source of 
variation in both the factor inputs of capital and labour,   i k  and  i m .    The Cobb-Douglas 
form of the revenue function enables us to obtain analytical solutions to the model.   The term 
R is the cost of capital which is exogenous in this partial equilibrium model, while i w , the 
wage of firm i , is a key variable to be determined.    The firm wishes to maximize profit as 
given by (1) while the workforce wants to maximize the wage bill,  i im w .   Since the demand 
for labour, 
D
i m , for a predetermined supply of workers,  i m , is elastic given a Cobb-Douglas 
production function where  i
D
i m m < , it follows that  ( ) 0 < ∂ ∂
i
D
i i w m w , so that the firm 4 
 
and the workforce would of one mind in wanting to reduce the wage until  i
D
i m m = , where 
all workers are employed.  
 
For the first two cases, there is no basis initially on which workers may ascertain whether any 
firm is more productive than any another, neither is there a scope for workers to re-allocate 
subsequently when they do find out.   The best assumption in the absence of any other factors 
determining the movement of workers is that their initial allocation across firms is uniform.  
The absence of ex post mobility means, by definition,  that this initial allocation persists,       
m mi =    i ∀                    ( 2 )  
The firm’s agreement payoff is given by (1) as  i i i i
A
i w m Rk m k A − − =
β α π ,  while in the 
event of a disagreement it receives zero,  0 =
D
i π  in the case where the investment decision 
and the wage bargain are simultaneous.   If there is no deal, there is no production, no 
employment, nor the incurring of any cost.  Similarly, the workforce’s respective agreement 
and disagreement payoffs are  i
A
i mw U =  and  0 =
D
i U .   
 
It is well known that the solution to the Nash bargain can be obtained by maximizing the 
Nash function, the geometrically weighted sum of the two bargaining surpluses where the 
weights represent the relative bargaining powers of the parties, 











i i U U N − − =
− 1
 
The demand for capital as implied by equation (1),  
()
) 1 ( 1 α β α
−
= R m A k i i ,                  ( 3 )  
which in conjunction with the solution to the Nash bargain gives the wage and profit solution 
as  
                                          
4 A foundational treatment of Nash bargaining is to be found in Binmore, Rubinstein and  Wolinsky (1986).   5 
 
()
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
α α β α α α α α ϖ
− − − − − − − = i i A m R w                                                      (4) 
( )
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
α α β α α α α ϖ π
− − − − − = i i A m R              ( 5 )  
The wage and the profit for each firm are, respectively, increasing and decreasing, monotonic 
functions, of the bargaining parameter,  i ϖ .  A distribution of total factor productivities 
entails distributions for both wages and profits under the assumption that the initial allocation 
remains unchanged, according to equation (1).    
 
Note that the wage is decreasing in the number employed,  0 < ∂ ∂ i i m w .   This suggests 
that the workers who allocated to a particular firm at the first stage have an incentive to 
prevent others from joining them later.  These respective groups could be designated 
“insiders” and “outsiders”, and the analysis of Lindbeck and Snower (2002) could provide a 
possible rationale, but not the only one, for the assumption of ex post labour immobility.  
 
2.2   Where investment precedes the wage bargain (the hold-up case) 
If investment precedes the wage bargain, firms anticipate that they will be left incurring the 
whole of the cost of capital in the event of disagreement, so that  i
D
i k Rˆ ˆ − = π , which implies 
a higher value for their bargaining surplus at   i i i w m m k A ˆ ˆ −
β α .    Note that throughout this 
subsection the key variables are hatted in order to distinguish them from their outcomes in 
the previous case.  As a consequence, the workforce - for a given level of capital – will be 
able to negotiate a higher wage,   
1 ˆ ˆ − =
β α ϖ m k A w i i i                   ( 6 )  
Firms anticipate this at any earlier stage and that their profits will be 
  i i i i k R m k A ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ − − =
β α ϖ π ,                 ( 7 )  
which are maximized at the investment level, 6 
 
()
) 1 ( 1
) 1 ( ˆ
α β α ϖ
−
− = R m A k i i ,                 ( 8 )  
Substituting this into equations (6)  and (7) implies the following wage and profit solutions,   
() () ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ˆ
α α β α α α α ϖ ϖ
− − − − − − − = i i A m R w              ( 9 )  
() ()
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ˆ
α α β α α ϖ α α π
− − − − − = i i A m R                                                    (10) 
A comparison of (8)-(10) with (3)-(5) shows that the hold-up will reduce the capital stock to 
the proportion 
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
α ϖ
− − , profit by the proportion 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
α α ϖ
− −  and that the wage 
will rise/fall if
α α α ϖ
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 /
− − − > < .   The ambiguous response of the wage is because 
increase workforce bargaining power raises the wage for a given capital stock but the 
anticipation of a higher wage also reduces the predetermined capital stock and, thence, the 
average product of labour.   Both parties have an incentive to agree to binding contracts, if 
possible, where unions are so strong that 
α α α ϖ
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
− − − > .    
 
2.3   Where investment precedes the initial allocation of workers to firms 
We now consider the possibility that firms’ may install their capital stocks before they recruit 
their workforces.   In a casual sense, a firm will be seen to be viable to workers, only if it has 
acquired access to complementary factors of production.   The capital stock will not only be 
generally indicative of its future labour productivity and wage, for a given total factor 
productivity, but will also be a specific signal of its total factor productivity.   Firms’ 
investment decisions are now part of their calculation for attracting prospective workers. 
The previous aspect of the hold-up still applies, so that equation (6) is replicated for the 
anticipation of the wage,  
1 ~ ~ − =
β α ϖ i i i i m k A w ,               ( 1 1 )  
except tildes are now used to distinguish this final case.    As previously, the firm anticipates 
its profit will similarly be, 7 
 
i i i i i k R m k A
~ ~
) 1 ( ~ − − =
β α ϖ π ,                                                                             (12) 
However, returning to equation (11), firms realise that a higher investment level, ceteris 
paribus, implies a higher wage will be subsequently bargained.   They, therefore, conjecture 
there is a relative labour supply that is determined by relative capital stocks,   
() m k k m i i
φ ~ ~
=               ( 1 3 )  
The log-logarithmic specification of equation (11) is anticipated on the basis of the Cobb-
Douglas form for the production function, and the parameter φ  is, as yet, an undetermined 
coefficient.    A firm believe that if it invests,   i k
~
, more than the average firm, it will attract 
more workers,  i m , than the average, m .   The only constraint is that the average number of 
workers per firm, m , is fixed for a given population of workers and a given number of firms, 
so that there will be a zero-sum game with respect to employment.      
 
The conjectured function is now to be determined in a way that is consistent with the model 
by solving for the undetermined coefficient.   The conjecture feeds in to the actual outcome, 
which in turn either supports or invalidates the initial conjecture.   Equation (13) is 
substituted into (12) to give 
i i i i k R m k k A
~ ~ ~
) 1 ( ~ − − =
− + β βφ βφ α ϖ π ,   
Profit is then maximized by each firm at an investment level of 
() ()
) 1 ( 1 ~
) 1 (
~ βφ α β βφ βφ α ϖ
− − − + − = R m k A k i i                                              (14) 
Equation (14) shows that firms’ investments relate differ only according to their TFP levels, 
i A .  Under the rational expectations assumption that all the model’s parameter values are 
known, the capital stock on the right-hand-side is a (noiseless) signal of TFP on the left-hand-
side, so that that prospective workers may exactly infer the level of TFP of any particular 
firm from its investment level, which is represented by inversion of equation (14), 8 
 
() () ()
βφ α βφ β βφ α ϖ




i i i k R k m k A E       (15) 
As a matter of deduction and through substituting (15) into (11), it is anticipated that each 
firm’s wage is     
() () ()
βφ β βφ β βφ α ϖ ϖ
− − − − + − =
1 1 1 ~ ~
) 1 (
~
i i i i k m R k m k w E                    (16) 
As the assumption is that labour is completely mobile at the first stage and 
as ( ) 0 ~ < ∂ ∂ i i i m A w E ,  an “arbitraging” process will ensue until anticipated wages are 
equalized across firms,  ( ) ( ) j j i i k w E k w E
~ ~
= ,  j i, ∀ .    Equation (16) shows that this obtains 
where    ()
( )( )
j j i i m k k m
β βφ − −
=
1 1 ~ ~
 ,   j i, ∀   or where 
()
() ( )
m k k m i i
β βφ − −
=
1 1 ~ ~
    i ∀                            (17) 
Consistency between the conjectured relationship in (13) and the actual relationship in (17) 
requires  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( β βφ φ − − =  or  
1 = φ              ( 1 8 )      
Substituting this condition into equation (14) then gives 
() ()
) 1 ( 1 ~
) 1 (
~ β α β β β α ϖ
− − − + − = R k m A k i i  
 
As   k
~
 is the mean of  i k
~
, some manipulation gives  
() () () ( )
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 ) 1 ( 1
) 1 (
~ α β α β α α β β α ϖ
− − − − − −
+ − = A E R m k     ,         (19) 
where   (.) E  is notation for the mean, so that each firm’s investment is 
() () () ( )
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 1 ) 1 ( 1
) 1 (
~ β α α β β α α β β α ϖ
− − − − − − −
+ − = i i A A E R m k                         (20) 9 
 
Equations (11)-(13) and (18)-(20) give solutions for the common wage and the firm-specific 
profit a  
() () () ( )
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ~ α β α α β α β α α α β α ϖ ϖ
− − − − − − − − − − + − = m A E R w         (21) 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ~ β α α β β α α β α α ϖ β α β α π
− − − − − − − − − + − − = A A E m R i
               ( 2 2 )  
A subsidiary point is that the initial mobility of labour eliminates the wage distribution but 
causes there to be a wider distribution of profits, since the variance of the logarithm of profits, 
which was previously ) var(ln ) 1 (
2 A
− −α , now becomes ) var(ln ) 1 (
2 A
− − − β α .    The 
main point of the analysis is stated as follows. 
 
Proposition One:  If  ) ( β α β ϖ + < , the capital stock will be higher where the 




Proof:  The average capital stock from equation (3) is  
() ()
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 α α β α
− −
= A E R m A k i .   Equation (19) shows that  k k >
~
 if  
() () ( ) ( )
α α β α β α α β α ϖ
− − − − − − > + −
1 ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 ) )( 1 ( A E A E .    Since there is a distribution 
for  A and since  () ( ) ( ) ( )
α α β α β α − − − − − − >
1 ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 A E A E ,  ) ( β α β ϖ + ≤  is a sufficient 
condition. 
 
This is to say, there is a positive effect on the capital stock if firms invest also to attract 
workers, and that this will dominate the negative effect of the hold-up if workers bargaining 
power is not too great.   All firms over-invest relative to the case where the allocation of 
workers precedes the investment decision.  However, no firm has an incentive to invest less, 10 
 
unless all others do too, because it will then attract a number of workers that is individually 
suboptimal.     
It is also of some interest to consider the effects on factor returns, and these for all three cases 
are summarized in the Table below. 
 
Table:  Wages and profits 
Investment is simultaneous with the wage bargain   
Ω − =
− − ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
α α α α α ϖ i i A w  
Ω − − =
− − m Ai i
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
α α α α α ϖ π  
Investment precedes the wage bargain but follows the initial allocation of workers 
() Ω − =
− − ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ˆ
α α α α ϖ ϖ i i A w  
() Ω − − =
− − − m Ai i
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ˆ
α α α α ϖ α α π  
Investment precedes both the wage bargain and the initial allocation of workers 
() () Ω + − =
− − − − − − ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( ~ α β α β α α α β α ϖ ϖ A E w  
() () ( ) ( ) Ω − + − − =
− − − − − − − − m A A E i i
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ~ β α α β β α α α α ϖ β α β α π
  
 where 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( α β α α α − − − − − − ≡ Ω m R  
 
On the basis of these values, it is also insightful to state the effect of investment-signalling on 
the factor payments in a final proposition.  
 
Proposition Two:   If the investment decision precedes both the wage-bargain and the 
allocation of workers, in comparison with the simultaneous case, (a) workers on average 11 
 
will be better off if  ()
α α α β α α ϖ
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1
− − + − ≤ , and  (b) firms on average will be 
worse off under reasonable parameters values.  
  Proof:  (a)   Calculating the average wage from equation (4) as   
() ( )
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
α α β α α α α ϖ
− − − − − − − = A E m R w    and comparing it with w ~ from 
equation (21) shows that  w w> ~  if   ( )
α α α β α α ϖ
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1
− − + − ≤ .    (b)  Profit for 
each firm always falls in moving from case 1 to case 2.   It can be shown that average profit 
will also fall moving from case 2 to case 3,   π π ~ ˆ > , for reasonable parameter values, where   
() ( )
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ˆ α α α α ϖ α α π
− − − − − Ψ = A E  and  
() () ( ) ( )
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ~ α β α β α α α α ϖ β α β α β π
− − − − − − − − + − − Ψ = A E  .  
Clearly,  π β π ˆ ) ( ~ = , if  0 = β .   First, in the limiting case where A  is  constant  across 
firms, π β π ˆ ) ( ~ < , if  0 > β  since  0 ) ( ~ < ∂ ∂ β β π .    Secondly, this inequality also holds 
where there a distribution of A across firms,  ) ( ~ β π  and where returns to scale are high.   
Using a first-order Taylor series expansion, we find  
() () ) (





1 ) 1 ( 1 A E A E
β α













+ ≈    where 
2 σ  is  the 
variance of A, normalized in terms of its squared mean,  () ( )
2 2 2 ) ( ) ( A E A E A E − ≡ σ , 
and then applying L’hopital’s rule, it can be shown that as   α β − →1 , 
0 ) (
) 1 ( 2
1 ) 1 (
1
2















β α   , so that  π β π ˆ ) ( ~ <  where  β  is 
large and  0
2 > σ . 
 
Workers will be better off if the investment decision precedes their allocation to firms, since 
the resulting increase in investment implies a higher average productivity of labour and wage.    
Vis a vis the simultaneous case, however, they will be better off for a wider range of their 12 
 
bargaining power parameter, ϖ , where  ( )
α α α β α α ϖ
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1
− − + − ≤ instead of 
α α α ϖ
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
− − − ≤   .   Firms, as a whole, are worse off because they are not only 
incurring an implicitly higher cost through the hold-up, but they are also investing 
inefficiently  ex post  by engaging in a zero-sum game over a fixed average number of 
workers at m .    However, if there is a sufficiently wide distribution of total factor 
productivities, firms for which  ( ) ( ) () ) (
1 ) 1 ( 1 A E A E Ai > >>
− − − − β α β α   will gain from 
investment signalling, since for them the allocative efficiency effect will of over-riding 
benefit. 
 
The question also arises whether there are general incentives for firms to act cooperatively 
behaviour by holding back on their investment decisions until a later stage?    On the one 
hand, this is not plausible for this particular model, because of firms are deemed to be 
continuously distributed along a unit measure.   On the other hand, if it were plausible, it is 
difficult to envisage a precommitment device for individually-specific, lower investment 
levels that are ex ante suboptimal.   
 
3.   Some further considerations 
First, in the joint absence of an ex ante signalling effect and ex post labour mobility, there is a 
wage distribution that reflects the distribution of total factor productivities.    The other polar 
case of completely mobile labour mobility leads to wage equalization and the alternative of a 
distribution of employment across firms.   One might suspect that reality rests somewhere 
between these two extremes, that labour is imperfectly mobile, so that there is a positive 
correlation between wages and employment across firms.   This is supported by the empirical 
evidence of the employer size-wage effect, for which Brown and Medoff (1989) have 
provided a number of alternative explanations, but which is intimately connected with the 
both the assumptions and the conclusions of this particular model.     
 13 
 
It was also assumed that workers do not initially know the productivity levels of firms.  This 
assumption might be more sustainable for new firms starting up rather than for older 
established firms with a track record.  There are at least two possible ways in which the 
current analysis may be sustained.  One is where total factor productivity levels are stochastic 
over time, so that track records are of limited importance.  Another is to specify a mix of new 
firms and old firms, where entrants are more disadvantaged than incumbents by the 
asymmetric information problem.  This promises to have interesting implications for 
economic growth with the possible result that aggregate investment is positively related to the 
level of firm turnover.  
 
Finally, as profits differ in the three cases considered, there are implications for the entry of 
firms within a longer-run perspective and a setting of general equilibrium.  There would then 
be further aggregate effects, both because firms are heterogeneous and because they operate 
under decreasing returns.   The existing results could either be endorsed or undermined, 
depending on the relationship between the number of firms and aggregate investment.     
However, in admitting one particular feature of long-run general equilibrium, it is difficult to 
exclude others, especially, the effect of the investment timing on the supply of investment 
funds in Devereux and Lockwood (1991).      
   
3.     Concluding comments 
The hypothesis that investment is decided simultaneously with the wage bargain, so that 
workers implicitly share in its cost, is probably atypical of many labour markets.   The known 
result that the firm will then have a lower demand for capital was replicated in Section 2.2.   
However, if the investment decision is made further back in time, even before workers 
allocate to firms, there may be a countervailing over-investment effect because firms invest 
also to signal their relative productivities in order to attract workers.  This additional, positive 
effect will dominate the negative hold-up effect, if workers are not too powerful at bargaining.  
The assumption that wage bargaining lags investment may not only be more plausible 
empirically but may also be conducive to over- rather than under-investment.   14 
 
The analysis is predicated implicitly on symmetric information between production firms and 
the financial institutions in the background that enable them to acquire capital.   Since, there 
is asymmetric information between the firms and workers, the efficacy of screening by 
financial institutions would play an important, although, up to now, hidden, role in the 
analysis.   This suggests that further research might investigate how extending asymmetric 
information to the arena of finance – one with which it is more popularly associated - might 
affect the main labour market and investment issues that have already been discussed.   
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